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Two features of East Asia￿s recovery from the financial turmoil of 1997-98 
appear to be rather paradoxical. First, the regional economies (except 
Hong Kong, China and Malaysia) have allowed a relatively greater albeit 
modest degree of variability of their currencies according to market 
conditions. Second, the regional monetary authorities have 
simultaneously appeared keen on bolstering reserves to historically high 
levels. This paper examines the subject of reserve management in the 
broader context of monetary cooperation in East Asia. The paper briefly 
reviews the factors that go into the determination of ￿optimal reserves￿ in 
general, and specifically in the case of East Asia. It then goes on to 
investigate the gains, if any, to be reaped if the East Asian economies 
were to pool their reserves.  
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1.         Introduction 
Two features of East Asia￿s recovery from the financial turmoil of 1997-98 appear 
to be rather paradoxical. First, the regional economies (except Hong Kong, China and 
Malaysia) have allowed a relatively greater albeit modest degree of variability of their 
currencies according to market conditions (Hernandez and Montiel, 2001, Rajan, 2002 
and Rajan, et al., 2002). Second, the regional monetary authorities have simultaneously 
appeared keen on bolstering reserves to historically high levels
1.  
A policy of stockpiling reserves has clearly been embraced by East Asia, which 
has the world￿s largest holdings of foreign reserves in aggregate. To emphasize this 
point, global international reserves (minus gold) stood at US$ 2,223 billion in May 2002, 
a near doubling in nominal terms since early 1994. Developing countries hold around 
two-thirds of the world￿s international reserves, with East Asia alone holding 38 percent 
of the global share in May 2002, up from 30.5 percent in 1994 (Aizenman and Marion, 
2003). Among the crisis-affected economies, Korea stands out as having amassed 
reserves particularly aggressively between 1992 and 2001 (Table 1)
2. Japan, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore rank as the largest holders of international 
reserves in the world (Aizenman and Marion, 2003). The whole of East Asia (i.e. 
inclusive of Japan) accounts for about half global international reserve holdings. 
                                                 
1 Of course, the impact of exchange rate flexibility on reserve holdings runs both ways. On the 
one hand, with flexible regimes, the exchange rate acts as a safety valve in response to balance 
of payments disequilibria. On the other hand, past exchange rate changes may be an indication 
of the extent of variability of and susceptibility to external shocks. Insofar as central banks need 
to hold reserves to counter these external shocks, this suggests the need to hold larger quantities 
of reserves. 
 
2 This desire by regional monetary authorities to accumulate reserves well beyond levels that 
would be deemed adequate by cost-benefit calculations is not a new phenomenon. In what 
became known as ￿Mrs Machlup￿s Wardrobe Theory￿, Machlup (1966) suggested that the 
acquisitive characteristics of monetary authorities in terms of adding to their reserves resembled 
those of his wife in terms of clothes. He argued that monetary authorities essentially looked to 
maximize their reserves. As such, the demand for reserves in any period could, according to 
Malchup, be characterized simply as being equal to the level of reserves in the previous period 






While interest in ensuring ￿reserve adequacy￿ diminished markedly following the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods, it has re-emerged as an issue of more general interest 
as a series of currency crises afflicted many developing economies worldwide in the 
1990s and early 2000. Fischer (2001c) nicely summarizes the importance of reserves in 
an era of capital mobility as follows. 
Reserves matter because they are a key determinant of a country’s ability 
to avoid economic and financial crisis. This is true of all countries, but 
especially of emerging markets open to volatile international capital 
flows￿The availability of capital flows to offset current account shocks 
should, on the face of it, reduce the amount of reserves a country needs. 
But access to private capital is often uncertain, and inflows are subject to 
rapid reversals, as we have seen all too often in recent years. We have 
also seen in the recent crises that countries that had big reserves by and 
large did better in withstanding contagion than those with smaller 
reserves.. (pp.1-3)  
 
This paper examines the subject of reserve management in the broader context 
of monetary cooperation in East Asia. The next Section briefly reviews the factors that 
go into the determination of ￿optimal reserves￿ in general, and specifically in the case of 
East Asia. Section 3 investigates the gains, if any, to be reaped if East Asian economies 
were to pool their reserves. Section 4 explores how the proposed reserve pool would fit 
into the larger context of the evolving East Asian monetary regionalism (Bird and Rajan. 
2002). The final section offers a few concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Cost-Benefit Calculus Determining Optimal Reserve Holdings 
2.1 Some  Analytical  Background 
 
Reserves are held because they act as a buffer against a balance of payments 
(bop) shock. Owned reserves represent a guaranteed and unconditional source of 
liquidity. However, there is a significant opportunity cost of stockpiling reserves, as the 
country effectively swaps high yielding domestic assets for lower yielding foreign ones
3. 
                                                 
3 Conversely, reserve holdings confer a benefit to nations that supply the reserve currency as 





We briefly outline below a simple theory of the demand for international reserves based 
on a cost-benefit calculus (Bird, 1978). 
The bottom-right quadrant of Figure 1 illustrates a negative relationship between 
the quantity of reserves held and the speed of adjustment. In other words, the lesser 
reserves held, the greater the speed of adjustment needed to adjust to a balance of 
payments shock. The bottom-left quadrant illustrates a positive association between the 
speed of adjustment to a BOP shock and the variability of income. The quicker is 
adjustment, the more variable is income. The top left quadrant reveals a negative nexus 
between (expected) income levels and the quantity of reserves held. This is essentially a 
representation of the opportunity costs of holding reserves, i.e. the larger the reserves 
held, the lower the amount of capital investment that may be undertaken
4. Putting these 
three quadrants together derives the top-left quadrant which shows a positive 
association between expected income levels and the variability of income. Thus, other 
things equal, the greater the demand for reserves, the slower the speed of adjustment 
and the lower the variability of income, though this benefit comes at a cost of lower 
income levels. 
The demand for reserves will be determined at the point of tangency between 
the central bank￿s indifference curve (ICA) and the curve showing the trade-off between 
expected income and variability of income (point A). Note that the more risk averse the 
central bank, the more steeply sloped the indifference curve (ICB) and therefore the 
greater the desired reserve holdings (point B).
  
The preceding framework can be thought of as a generalization and graphical 
representation of the buffer stock model developed by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981). 
Under certain assumptions, Frenkel-Jovanovic derive the optimal reserve holdings to be 
as follows: 
                                                 
4 Of course, to the extent that reserve holdings are seen as a sign of strength, a larger level of 
reserves may encourage greater capital inflows. We ignore this possible complementary effect in 








1/2         ( 1 )  
 
where R 0 = desired reserves, c = country-specific nominal constant; σ = standard 
deviation of reserve movements; and r = opportunity cost of holding reserves. Equation I 
reveals desired reserve holdings to be a positive function of volatility and a negative 
function of the opportunity costs of maintaining reserves. 
  
2.2  Reserve Holdings in East Asia: Are they Optimal? 
While Flood and Marion (2001) discuss how the Frenkel-Jovanovic model has 
performed empirically and proceed to outline useful theoretical and empirical extensions 
to it, Aizenman and Marion (2003) have recently estimated the following generalized 
reserve equation using a panel of 122 developing countries over the period 1980-96: 
 
ln(Rit/Pit) = α0 +α1ln(popit)+ α2ln(gpcit)+ α3ln(exait) + α4ln(imyit) + α5ln(neerit) + εt  (2) 
 
where: R is actual holdings of reserves minus gold (millions of US dollars deflated by the 
US GDP deflator, P); pop is the total population of the country; gpc is real GDP per 
capita; exa is the volatility of real export receipts; imy is the share of imports of goods 
and services in GDP; and neer is the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate.  
The authors explain the choice of dependent variables as follows:  
Real reserve holdings should increase with the size of international 
transactions, so we would expect reserve holdings to be positively 
correlated with the country￿s population and standard of living. Reserve 
holdings should increase with the volatility of international receipts and 
payments if they are intended to help cushion the economy, so we would 
expect reserve holdings to be positively correlated with the volatility of a 
country￿s export receipts. Reserve holdings should also increase with the 
vulnerability to external shocks. We therefore expect reserve holdings to 
be positively correlated with the average propensity to import, a measure 
of the economy￿s openness and vulnerability to external shocks. Finally, 
since greater exchange-rate flexibility should reduce the demand for 




to manage a fixed exchange rate, reserve holdings should be negatively 
correlated with exchange-rate volatility (p.6). 
 
In the case of East Asia, in-sample results largely confirm the authors￿ priors. 
Indeed, if anything, the estimated reserve equations systematically over-predicted 
reserve holdings (between one and two standard deviations from the average). This 
would be expected a priori as their estimating equation excludes any measure of the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves
5. However, out-of-sample results for the crisis 
period in East Asia in 1997-99 reveal a systematic under-prediction of reserves in most 
of the East Asian countries (except Malaysia). Incorporating political variables does not 
alter these conclusions. Thus, the authors conclude that ￿behavior has changed since 
the Asian financial crisis￿, and go on to suggest that the ￿recent build-up of large 
international reserve holdings in a number of Asian emerging markets may represent 
precautionary holdings￿ (p.11). In terms of the general framework outlined in Section 
2.1, this implies that the more risk averse a country￿s monetary authorities, the steeper 
is indifference curve, and therefore the greater the desired reserve holdings
6. 
Stockpiling reserves by the East Asian economies implies more generally that, at 
the margin, the benefits of extra reserves are perceived as exceeding the costs. There 
may be a political premium placed on avoiding future crises and retaining the option of a 
slower speed of adjustment should the balance of payments position weaken and 
external assistance be found wanting. In other words, holding reserves may be 
considered a form of insurance premium (￿precautionary motive￿)
7. However, this comes 
at a price given the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Is there any way in which the 
                                                 
5 Aizenman and Marion (2003) exclude the opportunity cost variable as they argue that it is not a 
significant explanatory factor, but more so because of the difficulty of obtaining consistent data 
series on interest rates for developing countries.  
 
6 Unlike the more general framework, the Frenkel-Jovanovic model does not explicitly capture 
changes in loss aversion.  
 
7 Apart from concerns about conditional access to fickle global capital markets (discussed in Bird 
and Rajan, 2003; also see Willett, 2001), Aizenman and Marion (2003) also suggest that this 





liquidity yield from holding reserves may be generated without the need for individual 
countries to continually accumulate them? One way maybe for regional economies to 
pool their reserves and derive the benefits of scale economies. But how might one judge 
the potential size of benefits from reserve pooling? Before doing this, we first need to 
estimate the level of reserves that members would have to hold independently.  
 
3.  Assessing the Size and Benefits of a Reserve Pool 
3.1  Reserve-to-Imports Ratio Revisited 
Assume reserve pooling is undertaken as part of broader policy of economic 
integration including trade and monetary integration
8. In such a case, some formerly 
external trade will become intra-regional. Insofar as the reserve to imports (R/M) ratio is 
considered a reasonable, albeit highly imperfect, yardstick of reserve adequacy (Bird 
and Rajan, 2003), the reclassification of a large part of formerly external trade will now 
imply that the region will be holding a substantial pool of ￿excess reserves￿. In the case 
of East Asia, how much would this excess be and what would be the gains from reserve 
pooling?
9 
To ascertain the gains from reserve pooling we first compute the international 
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8 See Section 4 for a discussion of reserve pooling in the presence of regional exchange rate 
coordination. 
 




where:  i R  and () ∑ i R  are the average level of reserves held by the individual country 
(i) and by the group countries during a specified period of time, respectively.  i M  and 
() ∑ i M  are the average monthly level of imports for each country (i) and the group, 
respectively. (n) is the total number of countries joining the group.   
If reserve pooling among the East Asian economies is part of broader goal of 
trade integration, the arrangement implies that no reserves will be needed to cover the 
imports other member countries. Consequently, the same average level of individual 
country reserve holdings will correspond to a higher number of monthly import coverage. 
Conversely, to maintain the same import coverage, each member country and the 
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where: (s) is the share of intraregional imports. 
  We now compute the ￿hypothetical reserve level￿; the level of total international 
reserves that the individual country )) ( ( i HR and the non-pooling group  ) (HR would have 
to hold to have the same months of import coverage that it would have under the pooling 
arrangement. 
i M i Ratiopol i HR * ) ( ) ( =       ( 7 )  
    n i M Ratiopol HR
i





The average excess gains from joining the pooling for each individual member 
(equation 9) and for the group (equation 10) are: 
 




i R HR ER       ( 1 0 )  
where: (ER) is the excess reserve level during the specified period. 
Tables 2a and 2b report the findings for the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) plus China, Korea and Japan ￿ commonly referred 
to as ASEAN plus Three (APT) ￿ as well as Hong Kong, for the pre-crisis and the crisis 
period of 1990-1998.
10 We obtain the foreign exchange reserve data from the IFS CD-
ROM of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
From our computation, we find the average share of intraregional imports in the 
overall imports of the individual country ranges from the low of 28 percent for Japan and 
the high of 66 percent for Hong Kong. For the ASEAN-5, the range is narrower between 
43 percent to about 52 percent. As for the overall group of the economies, we find that 
the average (s) equals 0.45 for that group of East Asian economies during the specified 
period.  
Based on the available information, we then calculate  )) ( ( i Ratiopol and 
) (Ratiopol . The results show that the number of months of import coverage for the 
ASEAN-5 should increase by as little as 2 months for the Philippines and as much as 7 
months for Singapore (Table 2a). As for the rest of the East Asian countries, Korea will 
gain the smallest increase in the import coverage by less than 2 months, while Hong 
Kong will gain the most (an extra coverage of 8 months of import). Lastly, the East Asian 
                                                 
10 The shares of intra-regional imports (s) are based on data from The East Asian Economic 




countries as a group should enjoy an extra coverage of 4 months of import by 
committing themselves to the regional pooling.   
Reflecting the variations in the reserve-import ratio, the average ￿excess￿ 
reserves from pooling for each individual are also very diverse (Table 2b). Korea 
appears to gain the least amount of excess reserves (US$15 billion), while Hong Kong 
stands to gain the most (US$105 billion). As a whole, East Asia stands to reap around 
US$330 billion of excess reserves for the period between 1990 and 1998
11. This being 
the case, a logical question would be what are the fiscal costs of failing to derive the 
reserve benefits from integration?  
We compute the fiscal costs (FC) as follows: 
 
( ) ) ( * int int ) ( i ER i FC
USA i− =        ( 1 1 )  
 
( ) ER FC
USA EA * int int − =        ( 1 2 )  
 
where:  )) ( ( i FC  and  ) (FC   are the estimated fiscal cost for the individual country and for 
the group.  ) (int
i  is the average annually of 3 to 6 months time deposit rate offered by 
the commercial banks of the individual East Asian country.  ) (int
EA  is the average 
annual interest rate of the 3 to 6 months time deposit offered by East Asian commercial 
banks; and ) (int
USA is the equivalent average deposit rate offered by US commercial 
banks. We obtain interest rate data from the IFS CD-ROM produced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)
12.  
                                                 
11 Another way of seeing the gains from integration is to note that if the region wanted to maintain 
the same average import coverage without pooling (i.e. 5.6 months), the amount of reserves 
saved would be about US$ 185 billion. 
 
12 We assume for simplicity that the bulk of East Asian reserves is held in US dollars. This is 
probably not too far from reality. In 1999, 78 percent of global international reserves were in US 
dollars (D￿Arista, 2000). Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) offer a recent discussion on the 




The average interest rate in East Asia shows a 3.3 percent premium over the 
equivalent US rate although there are significant variations within East Asia. For the 
specified period, the commercial bank deposit rate in Indonesia averaged close to 15 
percent higher than the US rate. The Philippines￿ and Thailand￿s commercial deposit 
rates were also significantly well above the US rates by about 7 percent and 5 percent, 
respectively. In contrast, the commercial banks in Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan 
offered lower deposit rates than the commercial banks in the US. From equations 11 
and 12, we derive the fiscal cost of holding excess reserves to be well over US$ 10 
billion for the period at hand for the group. China and Indonesia suffered the highest 
fiscal costs (about US$1.7 billion and US$ 1.5 billion, respectively). Malaysia and 
Philippines incurred average fiscal costs of around US$320-US$370 million, while those 
of Thailand and Korea were US$1.2 billion and US$670, respectively. Due to the 
negative interest rate spreads, Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan actually benefited from 
holding their excess reserves denominated in US dollars. The foregoing 
notwithstanding, it is important to note that the results highlighted in Table 2b are likely 
to underestimate the full fiscal cost of reserve hoarding as the cost of the financial 
capital in East Asia (reflected by the deposit interest rate) is likely to be far lower than 
the marginal cost of capital (which is the true opportunity cost of reserves). 
 
3.2    Variability of Reserves: Coverage Index 
While the preceding measure of reserve gains from integration intuitive, there are 
at least two problems with it.  
First, there are limitations in using imports as a scaling factor for determining 
reserve adequacy. Crises during the 1990s and beyond have predominantly been crises 
of the capital account. Reserve adequacy benchmarks accordingly need to be modified 
to allow for both imports and capital outflows as potential drains on reserves (Bird and 
Rajan, 2002a, Fischer, 2001c and Reddy, 2002). For instance, the Reserve Bank of 




(W)ith the changing profile of capital flows, the traditional approach of 
assessing reserve adequacy in terms of import cover has been 
broadened to include a number of parameters which take into account 
the size, composition, and risk profiles of various types of capital flows as 
well as the types of external shocks to which the economy is vulnerable 
(Reddy, 2002, p.6). 
 
Second, the foregoing analysis assumes that reserve pooling is carried out in 
tandem with intensified trade and monetary integration. What if the region does not opt 
for economic integration form?
13 Is there any way of gauging the gains from reserve 
policy? Since international reserve holdings have been found to be a theoretically and 
statistically significant determinant of creditworthiness (see Bird and Rajan, 2003 and 
Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001 and references cited within), depleting them may induce 
capital outflows. If capital outflows reflect a perception within private capital markets that 
a country is illiquid, reducing international reserves is unlikely to be an effective strategy. 
The reversibility that makes reserve depletion credible in the context of trade deficits is 
often absent in the context of capital outflows (Bird and Rajan, 2002a).  
  In view of the foregoing, there seems to be a sound rationale for minimising the 
variability of reserve holdings. How is this related to a reserve pool? Medhora (1992b) 
observes 
By belonging to the reserve pool, the member countries have￿access to 
the others￿ reserves during times of need. At the same time, by pooling, 
each country is taking on the variability of the entire pool, rather than just 
the variability of its own reserves (p.213).  
 
It has been argued that a more appropriate way of measuring international 
reserve adequacy is to compare average reserve holdings with their variability 
(Dodsworth, 1978, Medhora, 1992a,b and Williams et al., 2001). This so-called ￿reserve 
coverage index￿ encompasses two potential sources of gain from reserve pooling, viz. 
an increase in average effective holdings and a decrease in their variability.  
We define the coverage index in country i as: 
 
                                                 
13 This is an important point -- while the ASEAN and China are planning on forming an FTA over 






Ci =       ( 1 3 )  
 
where:  PR is the average level of reserve holdings (or access to reserves) i.e. effective 
reserves during a particular time period and  ) (PR Var is the variability these during the 
same period
14.  
  Each individual country may also consider a partial pool, whereby each can 
access its own reserves as well as the partially pooled reserves of all the other 






























i C is the coverage index for the partial pool for each individual country (i).  p is 
the degree of pooling (0 <  p < 1) and  i R and  j R  are the total reserves of country i 
and j  (assumed to be the members of the pool).  
  From equations 9 and 10, the coverage under reserve pooling will be higher than 
in the independent situation if the variability of the pool is lower than that of each 
country￿s reserves separately, or if the increased access to the larger pool of reserves 
outweighs the higher variability of the pooled reserves.  
The formulation of the pooled-coverage index assumes that each country has 
unrestricted access to the pool. If one country draws on the pool it reduces coverage for 
the other member countries. Hence, the pooled system is a zero sum game. The effects 
of pooling can be quantified by examining the hypothetical scenario in which ￿each 
                                                 





country had wanted to maintain the level of coverage that it actually enjoyed, but did not 
belong to the pool￿ (Medhora, 1992b, p.217).  
This hypothetical reserve level is calculated by using the following equation. 
 
) ( * i
p
i i R Var C HR =        ( 1 5 )  
 
i HR  is the hypothetical reserve -- the level of reserves that each country would have 
had to hold had it not belonged to the pool, but still wanted to maintain the same 
coverage afforded by the pool. 
p
i C  is the coverage index of country iunder pooling, and 
) ( i R Var is the variability of country i￿s own reserves. The gains/losses from reserve 
pooling may be measured as follows: 
 
PR HR L G − = /        ( 1 6 )  
 
where:  ) / ( L G is the gain (+) or loss (-) in international reserve levels and HR and PR 
are the hypothetical and actual average foreign exchange reserves, respectively. 
  Table 3 reports the average quarterly reserve holdings for each country and their 
variability from the last quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2002
15. Based on this data, 
and for each country, we first compute the coverage index without pooling (0 percent) 
and then simulate the country￿s coverage index by imposing additional 10 percent 
increments in the level of pooling commitment (from 10 percent pooling to 100 percent 
pooling) (Table 4). The overall coverage index without pooling for the selected East 
Asian economies is well above 4. However the range runs from 1.76 for Korea to 8.02 
for Thailand. We then simulate the coverage index for every 10 percent increment in 
pooling commitments. The highest overall average for the coverage index with pooling is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 




found to be at a 10 percent commitment; it implies a significant gain from pooling. We 
estimate the coverage index for every 1 percent from 0 to 10 percent and then from 10 
to 20 percent to locate the level of pooling that will most benefit the East Asian   
economies as a group. The results are again summarized in Table 4. 
Several key findings emerge. Based on the highest overall average of coverage 
index, our results suggest that as a group the economies stand to benefit most by 
committing to a one percent pooling arrangement. However, looking at the individual 
countries, the pooling arrangement will not benefit all members equally; the optimal 
shares to be pooled may be different across countries. For instance, Indonesia will 
benefit most from 20 percent pooling, while the other two ASEAN economies 
(Philippines and Singapore) and Hong Kong enjoy the highest coverage index by 
pooling a mere 1 percent share of their respective reserves
16. As for the larger North 
Asian economies, Japan, Korea and China, gain most by committing all their respective 
reserves. Malaysia and Thailand are the only two countries that do not benefit by any 
level of pooling commitment.  
Next, Table 5 (Column 2) shows the hypothetical reserves within a pool, 
assuming each country participates according to its optimal shares as previously 
calculated. Two caveats need to be noted before proceeding. First, the optimal shares in 
Table 4 were computed on the assumption that all countries in the group contribute an 
identical proportion of their reserves to the regional pool. A 20 percent share may no 
longer be optimal for Indonesia when other countries are not pooling the same share of 
their own reserves. Second, we assume that Malaysia and Thailand participate at a 1 
percent share (given the other benefits from being part of a regional reserve 
arrangement).    
Keeping these caveats in mind, we find that for the group as a whole, the 
aggregate reserve savings (i.e. hypothetical less actual reserves) is over US$240 billion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
exchange reserve holding data from the IFS CD-ROM, IMF. 




The corresponding fiscal gains to the region from pooling (or fiscal costs from not 
pooling) is about US$ 1 billion; with significant variations between individual countries. 
The fiscal costs for Malaysia and Thailand are negative, though relatively negligible 
since our calculations suggest that any pooling is sub-optimal for them. Those for Japan 
and Singapore are negative as their respective interest rates are less than the US 
interest rates of an equivalent maturity. However, as noted, if we were to use the 
differential between the marginal cost of capital in these two countries and the US 
interest rate, the fiscal costs to these two countries are likely to be positive. 
 
3.3  Caveats Regarding the Coverage Ratio 
 
  The coverage ratio estimated above is among the first formal attempts to 
quantify the costs and benefits of regional reserve pooling. This said, its use as a 
measure of assessing the adequacy of reserve holdings is not without its limitations. Key 
among these is the fact that it is probably a more appropriate measure of the benefits 
from diversification. Reserve pooling in the Asian context largely focuses on the 
￿insurance￿ motive, i.e. access to a liquidity pool at times of crisis in international capital 
markets. In relation to this, the very presence of a large shared liquidity pool of reserves 
may, ceteris paribus, reduce the probability of a crisis. Our analysis suggests that there 
are greater benefits to be had from partial as opposed to complete pooling.  
 
4.   Some Further Implications 
With memories of crisis in 1997-98 still reasonably fresh, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that East Asian countries have exhibited a desire to stockpile reserves to 
finance international transactions, meet unexpected difficulties in their balance of 
payments, and provide an insurance or a ￿war chest￿ against future crises. However, an 
important limitation of such a reserve-hoarding policy is that it carries potentially large 
implicit fiscal costs as the country effectively swaps high yielding domestic assets for 
                                                                                                                                                 




lower yielding foreign ones. Assuming, that countries want to retain a relatively open 
capital account, is there any way in which the liquidity yield from holding reserves may 
be generated without the need for individual countries to continue to accumulate them?  
From a systemic and individual country perspective it may be desirable to have 
￿tiers of liquidity￿ (or concentric defence lines). The top tier would be owned reserves. 
From a government￿s perception an advantage associated with these is that they may 
be used quickly and without conditions. The second tier could take the form of regional 
liquidity arrangements. This tier could take the form of a regional reserve pool. In the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
17,  
each central bank is obliged to maintain 65 percent of its official reserves 
in the operations account. In the first instance, each country draws down 
on its own account of pooled and unpooled reserves. Once these are fully 
drawn down, the other countries￿ pooled reserves may be used. In 
essence, there is no statutory limit on a member country￿s use of 
reserves. A crisis management scheme takes over 
when..(aggregate)..reserves fall below the prescribed threshold, not when 
the reserves of individual countries are exhausted (Williams et al., 2001, 
p.7). 
 
East Asia could establish a similar arrangement. 
 
The third tier would be conventional IMF lending which in turn ought to be sub-
divided into CCL/liquidity-based lending and more conventional structural adjustment 
based lending. In the case of the former, it would be appropriate for the conditionality 
linked to liquidity-based lending to be closely aligned with financial and macro 
conditionality determined by the regional monetary facility (in conjunction with the IMF). 
All in all, with such a tiered structure, the degree of liquidity could be inversely related to 
the degree of conditionality.  
In the case of the second tier and a regional reserve pool in East Asia, a natural 
starting point would be the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) which is essentially a network of 
                                                 
17 The WAEMU, established in 1994, consists of eight countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d￿Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The WAEMU has a common central 
bank (BCEAO) and shares some other institutions. The WAEMU and the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) together comprise the CFA franc zone (Williams 





bilateral currency swaps and repurchase agreements as a ￿firewall￿ against future 
financial crises. In broad terms, the CMI is aimed at providing countries facing the 
possibility of a liquidity shortage with additional short-term hard currencies. While the 
CMI is undoubtedly an important first step towards intensified monetary cooperation, on 
its own, and given the manner in which it is presently structured, its effectiveness is 
questionable. It is, after all, still an uncoordinated and decentralized swap arrangement.  
An important next step would therefore be to reinforce and augment the existing 
bilateral currency swap arrangements (BSAs) under CMI if it is to be made a credible 
and effective financing mechanism. The size of currency swaps, though large in 
comparison to some countries￿ quotas in the IMF (Henning, 2002), remains small in 
absolute terms. Currently, the total amount of BSAs covering all 13 East Asian countries 
is estimated at around US$20 billion, with the maximum amount of money that any 
individual country can draw varying significantly. Nonetheless, the US$ 20 billion that is 
available in aggregate is comparable to the US$ 17.2 billion that was granted to 
Thailand on its own as part of the IMF program in 1997-98 (Chang and Rajan, 2001). If 
the aim of liquidity arrangements is to ensure the availability of large-scale liquidity in 
crisis periods, the current size and manner in which the CMI is structured needs to be 
reformed.
18  
  If the CMI is to be built upon as a way of providing short-term liquidity at the 
regional level, the facility needs to be extended to establish a fully-fledged regional 
reserve pooling mechanism or liquidity support program (Henning, 2002). Indeed, if the 
hitherto decentralized and bilateral swap arrangements are activated collectively, the 
CMI will go a long way to being a de facto regional pooling arrangement.  
                                                 
18 Henning (2002), Park (2001) and Wang (2001) offer comprehensive descriptions of the CMI 
and offer useful suggestions on how it may be built upon while still maintaining its credit line 





But hitherto, many Asian governments have been unwilling to consider 
restructuring the CMI to create a more formalized regional structure. And establishing a 
regional reserve pooling will not be an easy task. 
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
The fact that the Asian economies maintain about 50 percent of the world￿s 
foreign exchange reserves suggests that first there is a potential resource misallocation 
with significant opportunity costs and second the region has sufficient aggregate 
reserves to develop a large and credible common reserve pool arrangement. The 
reserves are reasonably evenly distributed across many strong currency countries 
including Japan, China, Korea and Singapore. This is important since if the region have 
a balance of ￿weak currency countries, creation sustainability of a common reserve pool 
would be a problem. It is highly unlikely that strong currency countries would allow their 
reserves to be constantly compromised by weaker currency countries. Conversely, if 
reserves are evenly distributed among a number of ￿strong currency￿ countries, they will 
be able to work together and to encourage the weak currency ones to implement 
necessary macroeconomic and structural reforms in order to remain eligible to draw 
upon the common pool when needed.   
Member countries with somewhat smaller reserves or limited technical capacities 
may stand to gain further by participating in a centralized reserve pooling mechanism 
since their capital contributions might be more efficiently managed. 
If the CMI does evolve into a regional liquidity facility, it would be natural to ask 
whether effective financial cooperation can be pursued without regional exchange rate 
coordination. Certainly, any explicit form of exchange rate coordination would be helped 
by a reserve pooling arrangement. But it would also require the closer coordination of 
regional macroeconomic policies, which in turn may require some sort of constraining 
arrangement to ensure policy compliance and avoid moral hazard. Asia in contrast, does 




coordinated exchange rate regime (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1999). Indeed, small but 
strong currency countries like Singapore are unlikely to be willing to forsake the 
discretion they have over their own macro policy and subordinate this to a regional 
monetary alliance that is untested and where their voice would be small.  
Greater exchange rate coordination facilitates intra-regional trade and the 
optimal size of reserve holdings of the region as a whole might decline as intra regional 
trade replaces external trade
19. In addition to this, the reduced need to stabilize intra-
regional exchange rates also implies a lower precautionary demand for reserves
20. 
Furthermore, countries hold reserves as a war chest against adverse geopolitical 
developments and other ￿non-market considerations￿ (Reddy, 2002). To the extent that 
closer monetary integration enhances intraregional security and reduces some of these 
intraregional geopolitical considerations, the region￿s aggregate demand for reserves 
may decline. 
 
                                                 
19 Frankel and Rose (2002), Glick and Rose (2002) and Rose (2000) estimate gravity models 
using both cross-sectional and time series data and conclude that a common currency is 
especially trade stimulating intraregionally. 
 
20 Offsetting these effects, with a full-fledged currency union, there will be an automatic decline in 
￿international reserves￿ with the re-definition of regional currencies. However, this is of less 
relevance for Asia (compared to Europe, for instance) as the US dollar is the most important 
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Reserves as Proportion of Imports (months),  
GDP (in percent) and Average Amount (in US$ millions) 

































































































































































































































































      a) Ratio to average monthly imports of Merchandise goods. 
  b) 
 Average of total foreign exchange reserves minus gold. 






Reserve-Import Ratio With and Without Pooling 
(ASEAN-5) + Korea + China + Hong Kong + Japan 
(1990-1998) 
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a/  Raw data are obtained from East Asian Economic Perspectives, Vol.11, February 2000, The International 









































































































































































Average and Variability of the Foreign Exchange Reserves
a 
(Q4: 1993 – Q1: 2002) 
 
 Average  Reserve 
(US$ million) 


























































a/ Variability computed using standard deviations. 
Source:  Computed from IFS-CD ROM and ADB database.  
 
Table 4 
Coverage With and Without Pooling for ASEAN-5, Korea, Japan, China and Hong Kong 
(Quarter 4, 1993 ￿ Quarter 1, 2002)
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Indonesia  3.07  3.128  3.150  3.152  3.148 3.147 3.146 3.145 3.144 3.144 3.143 3.143 
Malaysia  6.75  6.741  4.080  3.585  3.406 3.313 3.257 3.219 3.192 3.172 3.156 3.143 
Philippines  3.24  3.261  3.176  3.159  3.153 3.149 3.147 3.146 3.144 3.144 3.143 3.143 
Singapore  6.19  7.559  4.752  3.982  3.661 3.486 3.376 3.300 3.245 3.203 3.169 3.143 
Thailand  8.02  8.010  4.319  3.690  3.466 3.352 3.283 3.236 3.203 3.178 3.159 3.143 
Korea  1.76  1.856  2.399  2.677  2.828 2.924 2.989 3.037 3.073 3.101 3.124 3.143 
Japan  2.73  2.746  2.818  2.889  2.945 2.989 3.027 3.057 3.084 3.106 3.126 3.143 
China  2.24  2.275  2.520  2.699  2.818 2.905 2.969 3.019 3.059 3.093 3.119 3.143 




























a/ Without pooling; 








Reserve Gains and Losses with the Pooling Scheme 













Gain / Loss  in 
Reserves 
(HR-PR) 
























































































































 a / with 20 percent pooling; 
b / with 1 percent pooling; 
c/ with 100 percent pooling; 
d/ derived using 
interest rate differentials of average time deposit of 3-6 months for 1993-2001; 
e/ the negative fiscal costs for 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan are due to the negative interest rate spread (the US time deposit rate is 































Determining the Optimal Reserve Holdings 
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